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90-1947.ZS
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
YEE et al. v. CITY OF ESCONDIDO, CALIFORNIA
certiorari to the court of appeal of california,
fourth appellate district
No. 90-1947. Argued January 22, 1992-Decided April 1, 1992
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause generally requires just compen-
sation where the government authorizes a physical occupation of
property. But where the Government merely regulates the property's
use, compensation is required only if considerations such as the
regulation's purpose or the extent to which it deprives the owner of
the property's economic use suggests that the regulation has unfairly
singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne
by the public as a whole. Petitioners, mobile home park owners in
respondent Escondido, California, rent pads of land to mobile home
owners. When the homes are sold, the new owners generally contin-
ue to rent the pads. Under the California Mobilehome Residency
Law, the bases upon which a park owner may terminate a mobile
home owner's tenancy are limited to, inter alia, nonpayment of rent
and the park owner's desire to change the use of his land. The park
owner may not require the removal of a mobile home when it is sold
and may neither charge a transfer fee for the sale nor disapprove of
a purchaser who is able to pay rent. The state law does not limit the
rent the park owner may charge, but Escondido has a rent control
ordinance setting mobile home rents back to their 1986 levels and
prohibiting rent increases without the City Council's approval. The
Superior Court dismissed lawsuits filed by petitioners and others
challenging the ordinance, rejecting the argument that the ordinance
effected a physical taking by depriving park owners of all use and
occupancy of their property and granting to their tenants, and their
tenants' successors, the right to physically permanently occupy and
use the property. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
Held:
1.The rent control ordinance does not authorize an unwanted
physical occupation of petitioners' property and thus does not amount
to a per se taking. Petitioners' argument-that the rent control
ordinance authorizes a physical taking because, coupled with the
state law's restrictions, it increases a mobile home's value by giving
the homeowner the right to occupy the pad indefinitely at a sub-
market rent-is unpersuasive. The government effects a physical
taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to the physical
occupation of his land. Here, petitioners have voluntarily rented
their land to mobile home owners and are not required to continue
to do so by either the City or the State. On their face, the laws at
issue merely regulate petitioners' use of their land by regulating the
relationship between landlord and tenant. Any transfer of wealth
from park owners to incumbent mobile home owners in the form of
sub-market rent does not itself convert regulation into physical
invasion. Additional contentions made by petitioners-that the
ordinance benefits current mobile home owners but not future
owners, who must purchase the homes at premiums resulting from
the homes' increased value, and that the ordinance deprives petition-
ers of the ability to choose their incoming tenants-might have some
bearing on whether the ordinance causes a regulatory taking, but
have nothing to do with whether it causes a physical taking. More-
over, the finding in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 439, n. 17-that a physical taking claim cannot be
defeated by an argument that a landlord can avoid a statute's
restrictions by ceasing to rent his property, because his ability to rent
may not be conditioned on forfeiting the right to compensation for a
physical occupation-has no relevance here, where there has been no
physical taking. Since petitioners have made no attempt to change
how their land is used, this case also presents no occasion to consider
whether the statute, as applied, prevents them from making a
change. Pp.5-11.
2.Petitioners' claim that the ordinance constitutes a denial of
substantive due process is not properly before this Court because it
was not raised below or addressed by the state courts. The question
whether this Court's customary refusal to consider claims not raised
or addressed below is a jurisdictional or prudential rule need not be
resolved here, because even if the rule were prudential, it would be
adhered to in this case. Pp.11-12.
3.Also improperly before this Court is petitioners' claim that the
ordinance constitutes a regulatory taking. The regulatory taking
claim is ripe for review; and the fact that it was not raised below
does not mean that it could not be properly raised before this Court,
since once petitioners properly raised a taking claim, they could have
formulated, in this Court, any argument they liked in support of that
claim. Nonetheless, the claim will not be considered because, under
this Court's Rule 14.1(a), only questions set forth, or fairly included,
in the petition for certiorari are considered. Rule 14.1(a) is pruden-
tial, but is disregarded only where reasons of urgency or economy
suggest the need to address the unpresented question in the case
under consideration. The Rule provides the respondent with notice
of the grounds on which certiorari is sought, thus relieving him of
the expense of unnecessary litigation on the merits and the burden
of opposing certiorari on unpresented questions. It also assists the
Court in selecting the cases in which certiorari will be granted. By
forcing the parties to focus on the questions the Court views as
particularly important, the Rule enables the Court to use its resourc-
es efficiently. Petitioners' question presented was whether the lower
court erred in finding no physical taking, and the regulatory taking
claim is related to, but not fairly included in, that question. Thus,
petitioners must overcome the very heavy presumption against
consideration of the regulatory taking claim, which they have not
done. While that claim is important, lower courts have not reached
conflicting results on the claim as they have on the physical taking
claim. Prudence also dictates awaiting a case in which the issue was
fully litigated below, to have the benefit of developed arguments and
lower court opinions squarely addressing the question. Thus, the
regulatory taking issue should be left for the California courts to
address in the first instance. Pp.12-17.
224 Cal.App.3d 1349, 274 Cal.Rptr.551, affirmed.
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehn-
quist, C. J., and White, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.,
joined. Blackmun, J., and Souter, J., filed opinions concurring in the
judgment.